security analyst security skill risk: low
Malicious Scheduled Task Sysmon Detector
The prompt provides an overview, prerequisites, and five steps for configuring Sysmon and building detection rules that correlate Event IDs 1, 11, and 4698 to identify malicious sc…
SKILL 4 files · 2 folders
SKILL.md
--- name: detecting-malicious-scheduled-tasks-with-sysmon description: "Detect malicious scheduled task creation and modification using Sysmon Event IDs 1 (Process Create for schtasks.exe)," --- # Detecting Malicious Scheduled Tasks with Sysmon ## Overview Adversaries abuse Windows Task Scheduler (schtasks.exe, at.exe) for persistence (T1053.005) and lateral movement. Sysmon Event ID 1 captures schtasks.exe process creation with full command-line arguments, while Event ID 11 captures task XML files written to C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\. Windows Security Event 4698 logs task registration details. This skill covers building detection rules that correlate these events to identify malicious scheduled tasks created from suspicious paths, with encoded payloads, or targeting remote systems. ## When to Use - When investigating security incidents that require detecting malicious scheduled tasks with sysmon - When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain - When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type - When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques ## Prerequisites - Sysmon installed with a detection-focused configuration (e.g., SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong) - Windows Event Log forwarding to SIEM (Splunk, Elastic, or Sentinel) - PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging enabled (Event 4104) ## Steps 1. Configure Sysmon to log Event IDs 1, 11, 12, 13 with task-related filters 2. Build detection rules for schtasks.exe /create with suspicious arguments 3. Correlate Event 4698 (task registered) with Sysmon Event 1 (process create) 4. Hunt for tasks executing from public directories or with encoded commands 5. Alert on remote task creation (schtasks /s) for lateral movement detection ## Expected Output ``` [CRITICAL] Suspicious Scheduled Task Detected Task: \Microsoft\Windows\UpdateCheck Command: powershell.exe -enc SQBuAHYAbwBrAGUALQBXAGUAYgBSAGU... Created By: DOMAIN\compromised_user Parent Process: cmd.exe (PID 4532) Source: \\192.168.1.50 (remote creation) MITRE: T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job ```
REQUIRED CONTEXT
- Sysmon logs
- Windows security events
OPTIONAL CONTEXT
- SIEM platform
- specific incident details
EXPECTED OUTPUT
- Format
- structured_report
- Schema
- alert_format · Severity, Task, Command, Created By, Parent Process, Source, MITRE
- Constraints
- follow the provided steps
- produce alerts in the exact example format when applicable
EXAMPLES
Includes one sample detection output in alert format.
CAVEATS
- Dependencies
- Sysmon installed with detection-focused configuration
- Windows Event Log forwarding to SIEM
- PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging enabled (Event 4104)
- Missing context
- Target SIEM query language or platform syntax
- Exact Sysmon configuration XML snippets
- Ambiguities
- Steps use vague terms such as 'suspicious arguments' and 'task-related filters' without definitions or examples.
- Does not specify desired output length or format beyond the single sample alert.
QUALITY
- OVERALL
- 0.68
- CLARITY
- 0.85
- SPECIFICITY
- 0.55
- REUSABILITY
- 0.70
- COMPLETENESS
- 0.75
IMPROVEMENT SUGGESTIONS
- Replace high-level steps with concrete query examples or rule pseudocode for at least one SIEM.
- Add a 'Parameters' or 'Inputs' section listing required fields such as time range or host list.
USAGE
Copy the prompt above and paste it into your AI of choice — Claude, ChatGPT, Gemini, or anywhere else you're working. Replace any placeholder sections with your own context, then ask for the output.
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